Here we are again, under water restrictions. That's not news if you live in Calgary or nearby, but might be for some of my readers. We spent a good part of the summer of 2024 under water restrictions because a large water main burst. I blogged about it here, if you want to remind yourself. I'm going to go in a different direction this time.
Sometimes it's interesting to look at a timeline of events. The pipe was installed in 1975, and it's safe to say that planning and procurement started several years before that. The pipe was a fairly new innovation of steel, concrete, and wire, and was supposed to last 100 years.
For reference here's the list of mayors since 1970 according to Wikipedia.
| 30 | Rod Sykes | October 22, 1969 | October 31, 1977 | 8 years, 9 days |
| 31 | Ross Alger | October 31, 1977 | October 27, 1980 | 2 years, 362 days |
| 32 | Ralph Klein[c] | October 27, 1980 | March 21, 1989 | 8 years, 145 days |
| 33 | Don Hartman | March 21, 1989 | October 23, 1989 | 216 days |
| 34 | Al Duerr | October 23, 1989 | October 22, 2001 | 11 years, 364 days |
| 35 | Dave Bronconnier | October 22, 2001 | October 25, 2010 | 9 years, 3 days |
| 36 | Naheed Nenshi | October 25, 2010 | October 26, 2021 | 11 years, 1 day |
| 37 | Jyoti Gondek | October 26, 2021 | October 29, 2025 | 4 years, 3 days |
| 38 | Jeromy Farkas | October 29, 2025 | Present | 63 days (as of December 31, 2025) |
The little c beside Ralph Klein means he resigned to become premier and Don Hartman was appointed to take his place till the next election.
Some of the comments in the news media are a perfect illustration of why one shouldn't read the unmoderated comments. My fear is that these ARE the moderated comments. They pretty much uniformly blame Nenshi and Gondek for the failures. Premier Smith is in the news blaming Nenshi, and suggesting that provincial oversight is needed for municipal water infrastructure.
Let's think about all this and try to do so in an orderly fashion.
Taxpayers are always screaming about tax increases, so the City is really sensitive around how much money it spends. Yes, I know, the nay sayers say the way Calgary spends makes drunken sailors look like models of restraint. And yes, some of their spending decisions look dumb. But generally if there's two options, the City will choose the cheapest one.
Sometimes they will spend more at the time, thinking it will save money on future expansion plans. One example of that was building an LRT junction under City Hall, thinking they would eventually run the LRT underground in a future expansion, and golly, wouldn't having an LRT station right inside be cool?
Except that underground line will never happen and for a while the homeless took it over till it was fenced up. You used to be able to see where it was, with a section of fence blocking access from the LRT tracks, but I haven't ridden the LRT in at least 5 years, so I've no idea what it looks like now. There is access from within City Hall so it's probably used for materials storage now.
When the water main was installed back in the day, I'm sure there were expansion plans to build out the network as the city grew, or plan for potential breaks. Except, that 100 year lifespan. Some engineer was probably worried about a single failure point due to some unlikely event, and covered his ass in an obscure report. But anyone doing a risk based assessment in the 80's would have ranked the risk quite low. Failures began within 15 to 20 years of installation due to a thinner gage of wire being used. (here)
So really, some of the first indications there might be a problem would have started surfacing about the very late 80's at earliest, and maybe not till into the 90's. (Don't forget, everything was rosy in Calgary after the 88 Winter Olympics.) I'd like to believe that about the time Duerr got elected some engineer was watching the literature and realized the failures were of the same kind of pipe Calgary installed. Who knows what they did with that information? There's probably a report, and the person who buried it probably went back and made sure the burial was permanent. Or maybe it was discussed in an engineering committee meeting, dismissed, and buried. Maybe they proposed spending some money on testing, and was denied.
As a digression, Duerr was known as the do nothing mayor. He didn't want to spend money on infrastructure because he wanted to keep tax increases small. Meanwhile, Calgary's population was exploding. Calgary passed 1 million population about 2006 or 2007. The wastewater plant manual I was reading in the mid-80's from 70's era material projected Calgary would reach that milestone in 2025. Everybody needs clean drinking water, and wants their poop to go away. Both those technologies get expensive, especially wastewater.
Bronconnier (known as Bronco by several columnists) vowed to catch up, and by golly he loved to build roads and LRT and various climate related initiatives. He wanted visibility. I'm pretty sure an underground pipe was not on his radar. Life went on.
Now it's 2010 and the pipe has been in the ground 35 years out of a projected 100 year lifespan. There are reports documenting the failures in other municipalities, and there are almost certainly reports documenting the testing that was done on that pipe and other parts of the network. There has been an ongoing program of updating water mains, so it's safe to assume the reports indicate problem locations, and they went onto a priority list limited by budget constraints.
That no work was done on the big water main indicates a couple things to me. Either the testing didn't find existing problems, or it did and the repairs didn't happen for some reason. It's entirely possible that one set of tests say things are good, and another that there's a problem, with the solution being to do more testing, or bring in a consulting specialist.
People think testing is easy. It's not. There are thousands of Km of water piping in Calgary and hundreds of thousands of connections to that piping. There is altogether too much leakage, and the City is trying to address the problem, and fixing it will cost money.
There is no one magic test to find a problem, or declare there isn't a problem, and all testing costs money. The bigger the pipe, the more area there is to fail. Different kinds of pipe need different kinds of tests. Composite materials are difficult in many ways. Interpreting the results and planning followup actions requires specific engineering competence to choose the right risk assessment methodologies.
The 2024 failure appears to be related to the wrapping wires snapping, which makes noise which can be detected. Acoustic testing became a thing somewhere around 2000, but I don't know when Calgary started doing it. In any case, until you get a failure it's hard to document exactly how well a test is working. After all, a test with a result of no indications of failure could mean there are no indications of failure, or that the test is faulty in some way, or is being done in the wrong location.
The current failure did not have audible wire snaps, so it appears to be a different failure mechanism. The photo I saw looked like someone had sliced the pipe open across the wires. One of the inspection methods in oil and gas is to dig a hole to the pipeline and inspect it, which creates the risk of striking the pipeline with an excavator shovel. Even then, all you really know is that one section of pipe is good. The presumption is is that with the same materials, the same soil conditions, and the same product in the pipe, that the corrosion will be similar. Those are not always valid assumptions.
While fixing the 2024 failure they found several other sections of the main that needed urgent repairs. But there is a lot of that kind of pipe in the ground, and with this many failures it's an easy assumption that there are other sections that are ready to fail, which explains the replacement program. I don't know if the specific 2025 failure area was tested, and if so, was identified as a risk or not. Some junior engineer is probably reviewing reports looking for that exact information.
Should the City have started a program back in the day to twin that water main, or to install additional mains to increase supply flexibility? That's an easy thing to say now. It's a much harder argument to make before the main fails. Be honest, even if administration had proposed to Council they authorize tens of millions of dollars on water main upgrades in 2010, what's the odds of it passing? That's an easy place to cut or defer costs. After all, the main is only one third into it's projected life and everybody is getting water out of their taps, except for some rare occasions during low river flow, or the smaller water main breaks that happen periodically. It would read like the City is installing unneeded redundancy and feathering their nest. And don't forget, there was a huge hailstorm in Calgary in 2010, causing hundreds of millions of dollars in damage. And then the floods of 2013 thoroughly distracted everyone from water main issues. There's always something happening, and an underground pipe is easy to ignore.
Towards the end of his term in office Nenshi had become an unpopular mayor, and Gondek was never popular. Neither had the political capital to push for an invisible water main project. Some councillors would have voted against anything they proposed, just on principle.
Premier Smith is talking provincial oversight, but that's just politics, trying to score cheap points. They are the least competent government in Alberta history. There is no reason to suspect they would be any better at oversight than Calgary, and have much less skin in the game. In fact, it's to their advantage to make Calgary and other municipal politicians look bad, so they look good in comparison, and distract the attention on their own flaws. Nobody should trust anything they say on any topic.
The City has already started working to twin the line, and promise to expedite it even more, if that's possible. It could take a couple of years, but that doesn't really solve the problem. They don't end up with twice the capacity or flexibility because the old line is unreliable. It should be taken out of service because another rupture could cause catastrophic damage to roads, bridges, buildings, or other infrastructure. We are then in the same position as before, with a single point of failure.
The oil and gas industry usually abandons pipelines in place. There's a process, though I can't remember the details now. I suspect abandoning this water main that way is not an option. The concrete will continue to corrode even in a dry condition, and failure could cause a sinkhole under the Bow River, or any of several major roads, or disrupt rail traffic. Just imagine them capping the line at each end, maybe closing all the isolation valves along the way, then getting a failure under the Bow River. Nobody would notice. Eventually the water would start coming out somewhere else from what everyone thought was a dry pipe.
The next step should be to remove the old pipe and install a new one there, which will probably mean significant disruption to nearby homes, businesses, and both road and rail traffic. And cost lots of money, let's not forget that.
But then isn't supplying clean drinking water to residents one of the primary things a city is supposed to do? I'm not sure what comes higher on the priority list.
The view out my window.












































